Senators Gear Up for Taiwan Policy Debate

The bill's symbolic components have come into question amid high tensions with China.

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It was a historically tense summer in the Taiwan Strait, featuring high-profile congressional visits and aggressive military drills by Chinese forces. For lawmakers, it underscored the urgency of arming Taiwan to defend itself—and just how delicate the situation is.

Senators from both parties have advocated legislation this year to upgrade Taiwan’s defenses—and its relationship with the United States—and they remain largely unified in pursuing it. Yet pushback from the Biden administration and caution among lawmakers means a revised version of the bill may be scaled back from the original.

Specific concerns vary from senator to senator, but interviews with lawmakers this week and a slate of proposed amendments reviewed by The Dispatch reveal an overarching theme: Some Democrats fear the symbolic elements of Sen. Bob Menendez’s Taiwan Policy Act could be inflammatory at a time when Taiwan isn’t prepared to defend itself from a Chinese invasion. 

The items most in question would heighten America’s official stance toward Taiwan and boost its diplomatic institutions. These include provisions like designating the self-governing, democratic island a major non-NATO ally and renaming its de facto embassy in Washington, D.C., from the Taipei Economic and Cultural Representative Office (TECRO) to the Taiwan Representative Office. It is unclear if those components will remain in the bill, but they were two of the sections most targeted for removal or changes in Democratic amendments obtained by The Dispatch.

Senators will debate the legislation Wednesday during a previously delayed meeting of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, which Menendez chairs. The talks have also unfolded at the staff level for the past month. One aide familiar with the situation said negotiations on a new version of the bill are expected to continue until the last minute before the mark-up, with the aim of incorporating as many senators’ requests as possible. The legislation is shaping up to reflect those concerns in some ways, the aide said, including by removing or tweaking some of the most controversial language.

The revisions come after senior Biden administration officials expressed opposition to aspects of the bill publicly and in private meetings with senators in recent weeks.

Senators may differ on just how far to go with symbolic measures supporting Taiwan, but they broadly agree on massive increases in military support to the island. The legislation would authorize $4.5 billion in security assistance to Taiwan over four years and ramp up training with Taiwanese forces. Those aspects would have a deep impact and are almost certain to pass out of the committee on Wednesday.

“The military financing piece has broad support,” Hawaii Democratic Sen. Brian Schatz said Monday night. “There seems to be a consensus emerging. But the symbols of sovereignty, I think, are causing some people some heartburn.”

Schatz has introduced amendments seeking removal of the section changing TECRO’s title and scrapping a portion that would elevate the director of the Taipei office of the American Institute in Taiwan to a Senate-confirmed position. He also proposed changing the designation of Taiwan as a major non-NATO ally to stating it is “treated” as a major non-NATO ally, consistent with the current U.S. approach.

Some amendments on the table appear minor but have big implications for how far the bill may go in asserting Taiwan’s right to self-determination. For example, separate amendments from Sens. Tim Kaine and Ed Markey would strike this symbolic sense-of-Congress language:

Markey’s proposal is part of a broader amendment removing any implications of U.S. recognition of Taiwan as a country. American policy strikes a delicate balance on Taiwan, not formally recognizing it yet also providing for close unofficial relations.

The bill as written could “undermine” America’s Taiwan policy in this respect, a spokeswoman for the National Security Council argued last month. However, the legislation includes language stating that nothing in it can be construed to restore diplomatic relations with Taiwan or alter America’s position on its international status.

Some senators believe the original bill also steps too far over the line of strategic ambiguity, the deterrence policy America has maintained for decades to keep it unclear if the United States would come to Taiwan’s defense in the event of an attack by China.

“I’m really looking to make sure that we maintain a strategy of strategic ambiguity,” Sen. Jeff Merkley told The Dispatch on Monday. “And if the bill doesn’t do that, I would have a very hard time supporting it.”

Merkley is a critic of the Chinese Communist Party’s human rights record and was a leading proponent of the Uyghur Forced Labor Prevention Act last year. He lobbied senior Biden administration officials for months to take a strong response to the genocide in Xinjiang. On the Taiwan issue, though, he’s heeding warnings from the State Department and others.

Merkley introduced an amendment shifting language in the Taiwan bill that mandates planning and annual reviews of the U.S. strategy to defend the island. On Tuesday morning, his office confirmed he made this proposal:

The changes are similar to an amendment we reported last month from Sen. Chris Murphy, a Connecticut Democrat.

Murphy has urged caution with the Taiwan legislation, even as he recognizes more military assistance is needed. Symbolic shifts boosting Taiwan’s status “do little practically to aid Taiwan’s defense, and instead mostly fan the flames of Chinese nationalism,” Murphy recently wrote. “The Taiwanese need time,” he continued, “and it does not make sense to take steps that might expedite an invasion.”

On Monday, Murphy said he hasn’t decided if he will support sending the Taiwan Policy Act out of committee on Wednesday: “We’re still in a really productive dialogue with Senator Menendez and other members of the committee about a path forward.”

Aides and senators expect the bill to pass with a mix of support from both parties, setting it up for consideration by the full Senate. To become law, it would also have to pass the House and win President Joe Biden’s approval.

Despite its magnitude, the committee debate on Wednesday won’t be particularly transparent. Senators will discuss the new bill and potential amendments in a room that does not allow video recording. And only a couple of news reporters have obtained seats to cover the proceedings.

The meeting may be heated. Some Republicans signaled on Monday they will push back on softening of the bill’s symbolic provisions.

“None of it’s designed to be inflammatory,” said Sen. Marco Rubio, a Florida Republican and critic of the Chinese government. “If that’s the way the Chinese Communist Party decides to take it, that’s their decision. We certainly can’t be making decisions around here on the basis of what they find inflammatory, because they find a lot of things that we would consider to be fundamental inflammatory.”

Rubio expects most Republicans will support the bill in the end. But, he added, “it’s an interesting committee. Sometimes you get surprised.”

Sen. Mike Rounds, another member of the panel, indicated he is undecided about his vote. He said some Republicans hold the same apprehensions Democrats do about escalating tensions with China.

“If we do it incorrectly, we can do some damage,” Rounds said. “On the other hand, it is a powerful way to send a message to China based upon our consistent support for Taiwan.”

The vote tally, of course, will depend on what the revised legislation looks like. 

“The cake isn’t baked yet,” summarized Sen. Jim Risch, the top Republican on the committee.

On the Floor

The House is scheduled to consider a bill ending the statute of limitations for civil actions related to child sex abuse crimes, which is currently 10 years. This would apply retroactively, allowing victims to file civil suits to seek damages from federal crimes that happened more than 10 years ago, including sexual abuse, trafficking, and pornography. It passed the Senate earlier this year—if the House approves it, the bill will go to the president’s desk for his signature.

The House may consider several bills dealing with veterans’ benefits this week. Members are also set to vote on a bill expanding protections for federal whistleblowers. A full list of bills the House could bring up this week is available here.

The Senate will continue to consider judicial nominees this week. Senate leaders may also move forward with a procedural vote on the same-sex marriage bill.

Key Hearings

  • Twitter’s former head of security, who has alleged serious privacy and security failures at the company, is scheduled to appear before the Senate Judiciary Committee Tuesday morning. Information and livestream here.

  • Top public health officials will appear before the Senate health committee Wednesday morning to testify on the U.S. government’s response to the spread of monkeypox. Information and livestream here.

  • The Senate Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs Committee will hold a two-part hearing Wednesday focusing on social media’s impact on homeland security. Witnesses from Twitter, Facebook, Youtube, and TikTok are slated to testify. Information and livestream here.

  • Experts will discuss how to modernize Congress during a hearing Wednesday morning. Information and livestream here.

  • The House Ways and Means Committee will hold a hearing Wednesday morning on the future of U.S.-Taiwan trade. Information and livestream here.

  • Members of the House Homeland Security Committee will meet Thursday morning for a hearing on securing industrial control systems against cyberattacks. Information and livestream here.

Of Note

Getting the Taiwan Policy Act right

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Comments (27)
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  1. Avatar photo
    Njh2005

    Haley, any idea why the NDAA has not been brought to the floor in the Senate?

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    Ben Connelly

    Taiwan is a country.

    Great piece, Haley!

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    MatthewRobin

    I hope people appreciate the difficulty we will have defending Taiwan. I wrote about it after Pelosi's visit. The conclusion still holds true today.

    https://infraredline.substack.com/p/defense-debrief-why-i-am-against

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    Robert Knudson

    It looks like the change actually formalizes Taiwan's current status: In addition, Pub. L. 107–228 provides Taiwan shall be treated as an MNNA, without formal designation as such.
    It seems like formal recognition of a status we already convey.

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    Chris L

    My language pedantry has become more crystallized lately due to having to review and revise bylaws for various things. So I find this genteel, closed-door argument about foreign policy verbiage absolutely exquisite.

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    EricRemcon@gmail

    Thank you for the details on the TPA even if I don’t understand the necessity of the distinctions. Does Xi really care what we call an already obvious de facto embassy or establish Senate confirmation of the de facto Taiwanese US ambassador? I would think the $4.5B in defense assistance and the military exercises would be more important to him.

    The nuance that stuck out to me was the designation as a “major non-NATO ally” vs “treated as a major non-NATO ally”. Does the treated language change something of significance in how US departments share information? For example, if DOD and the executive branch are actually following established guidelines/rules (a big if nowadays IMO), does the different designation stop some level of intelligence sharing about China’s military capabilities the US may be aware of? Or does dropping the “treated” allow for more US executive branch action to counteract China’s trade punishments toward Taiwan?

    If name changes are really a trigger for a possible invasion, it’s a good thing that I don’t have any involvement in legislation/negotiations because I probably would have started WW III by now. 😅

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      Robert Knudson

      I was under the impression that "major non-NATO ally" was a designation that allowed transfers of weapons systems and additional military cooperation :L https://www.state.gov/major-non-nato-ally-status/
      Seems super important if this is the case as we need to arm Taiwan now, since re-supply under Chinese blockade is not likely.

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      1. R. James

        If the change is "treated as a major non-NATO ally" would that allow offensive weapon sales without requiring the US to come to Taiwan's defense if attacked? If so, I could see how it would be appealing to some factions in Congress.

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        EricRemcon@gmail

        Thanks for the info, looks like my ears perked up on the right lingo. Hopefully enough members of congress will debate it intelligently.

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    Nate Dunlevy

    The before and after language sections are amazing. I've never seen anything like that in a story before.

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    1. Pohl

      It is nice and makes me think I’ve been missing out a bit by ignoring Uphill. If this is typical, I will dip in more often.

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        Kbroot

        Save Uphill for days where I can spend the time to read them thoroughly. Klon Kitchen’s technology pieces are similar. Both these writers work for reader comprehension for people whose expertise is elsewhere.

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  8. Duane Truitt

    The window dressing in the language of the bill doesn't mean very much. What matters is cold hard military assistance.

    I don't believe the PRC is prepared to ever do a military invasion of the Republic of China (or "Taiwan") - their intent for the last 73 years has been to try and talk the ROC into giving up ... which if they haven't figured out by now, particularly in the wake of all the broken promises in Hong Kong, is never going to happen. But that does not mean an invasion is their next step.

    It's one thing to carry out a seaborne invasion, under complete control of both the air and the seas, of a mostly bare coastline with a few fishing villages, like Normandy or Okinawa, and it's quite another to attack an island nation of nearly 30 millions who are very well armed and extremely motivated and have hardened all of their key military infrastructure for the last couple of decades, and have some extremely well equipped and motivated allies who are certainly going to contest both the air and the seas around the ROC.

    (for those who insist the Chinese are planning their own D-Day in ROC, note that the allied invasion of the mostly deserted Normandy coast involved a fleet of over 6,500 ships, the world's largest allied air force, 2 million soldiers, all arrayed against a beleaguered German Wehrmacht utterly exhausted from their three years of losing warfare on the eastern front and in north Africa. Th PRC has exactly zero of those circumstances and resources working in their favor).

    But even if the ChiComs were actually planning a virtually impossible invasion of the Republic of China, the experience of Russia is certainly going to give them pause - both in terms of how poorly Russian equipment has performed in the hands of uninspired conscripts and generals and colonels with no combat experience ... and how remarkably efficient American and NATO weapons work in the hands of motivated defenders. Perhaps the ChiCom militarists believe their own bullshit of invincibility, but Xi ought to take notice of how things have gone for his pal Putin, and ask himself if maybe accommodation is much better than futile intimidation. Chinese, after all, have an extreme affinity for saving face, and right now Putin has saved none.

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    1. R. James

      The problem is that the CCP leadership does not see itself in the same position as it was fifteen years ago, let alone seventy-three years ago. It sees itself in a commanding position about to over-take the US as the global leader in the world. It has promised its citizens a Chinese Dream by 2049, which includes China being the supreme world power and settling all territorial disputes by then. (And their territorial claims to Taiwan are death ground for the CCP.) The CCP would prefer that these changes happen peacefully, but it will achieve them by force if necessary. The other problem is that China is facing real socio-economic challenges to its long-term growth, which the CCP sees as a threat to its control of the country. This may convince the CCP leadership that a forced unification in the short-term, with all its risks and costs, is preferrable to a certain strategic failure in the long-term. I would point to the Senate justified concern over the vulnerability of Taiwan and caution our side of the same certainty of victory as you do of the "Chicoms".

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      1. Duane Truitt

        I cannot predict the PRC leadership's mindset ... but they've learned a great deal in the last 200 days ... wherein Putin shared the same dreams of Russian national domination of Europe and central Asia, and the same promises made to the Russian people ... and have now seen those dreams go up in the smoke of thousands of HIMARS and ATGMs and defenders who are more motivated than them.

        Not to mention the same dreams and propaganda of a militarist Japan in 1937-1945 that ended with the utter destruction of the nation ... and ditto with nazi Germany.

        The PRC cannot successfully invade and conquer the ROC, period. They do not have anywhere near the military forces to hope to carry off such an operation ... and devoting a large part of what they do have to that end would only disrupt and weaken their garrisoning of their own diverse nation which is quite likely to revolt and fly apart.

        People mistakenly think that mainland China is a much larger nation than the ROC, as if population is determinative. History is replete with the stories of nations far smaller than their adversaries yet ended up dominating militarily and economically. Russia is far larger than Ukraine - how much difference did that size difference make? Japan was far smaller than the Russian empire, yet easily conquered them in the 1905 war. The German Wehrmact was only about 1/5 the size of the allied military forces in 1940 Europe, yet easily and quickly liquidated the far larger militaries they faced.

        The PRC are far more afraid of their own people than of anyone else. They are literally sitting on a demographic and political powder keg.

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        1. R. James

          Your analysis has not taken into account the strategic changes over the last fifteen years. Economics is determinative. Military size, concentration and the ability to mobilize is determinative. The Chinese economy is the second largest in the world, by Purchasing Power Parity it is arguably the largest economy in the world. Taiwan around 21st by Purchasing Power Parity. It has an economy 1/30th the size of China. It's also largely dependent on China for its trade. History has shown the country with the largest economy usually wins out. It has also shown that the country which can most efficiently mobilize its economy into military forces wins out. The US has hollowed out its industrial base over many decades, seeing much of it go overseas, especially to China. Size and concentration of military force is also extremely important. China has the largest navy in the world, and it is concentrated in the Western Pacific, with a third of the fleet as close as 100 nm from Taiwan. Even if US goes to Taiwan's defense, it will be only able to bring a portion of its forces to bear initially and the rest of its forces will have to travel great distances to get into the fight. Which country sounds like Russia circa 1905 in this scenario? You bring up the Japanese and Germans in World War II. They lost because of their inferior economy and industrial capacity. This is not China's situation at present.

          Further, this brings up an important question of the will to fight a foreign war. The Japanese in WWII made a very foolish assumption that they had to attack the US in order to capture the Dutch East Indies. This ignored the isolationism in the US and assumed that the US would defend the Dutch East Indies, which in reality it would not do. Today, the CCP has conditioned its people to view the settling of all territorial disputes, especially Taiwan, as a vital national security interest. Does the US see Taiwan sovereignty as a vital national security interest? It is not clear if the US would go to war to defend Taiwan if US forces are not attacked at the beginning of the invasion.

          China is not Russia. Taiwan is not Ukraine. Russia is a meddling mercantilist economy built on energy wealth and hamstrung by oligarchy and kleptocracy. It's military largely still relies on outdated equipment and tactics. Ukraine is fighting a land war and has asymmetric capabilities at its disposal and can trade distance for time in its fight against invasion. It is also fighting an opponent whose military has atrophied over the last thirty years. China has undergone a massive military buildup over the last fifteen years. It's military is far more sophisticated and capable then Russia's. Taiwan does not enjoy the same tactical and equipment advantages as Ukraine enjoys over Russia. Taiwan is an island 100nm from China. Taiwan cannot trade space for time like Ukraine can. This will not be an easy fight or one guaranteed of success.

          "The PRC are far more afraid of their own people than of anyone else. They are literally sitting on a demographic and political powder keg."

          Yes, but why does this make you think that war is less likely? The CCP has promised the Chinese people that it will deliver on its territorial ambitions by mid-century. The CCP is also aware as is everyone that China's economy is slowing, and its demographics will cause growth problems for the remainder of the century. Waiting is not an option that the CCP can afford. The CCP also values its own survival more than the lives of its citizens. Short term risks and costs will be traded for long term success and regime security.

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          1. Duane Truitt

            The PRC simply cannot conquer the ROC and the PRC knows it. The PRC has never in its history won a war or even won a significant battle. It has no institutional knowledge of how to win anything. Largeness means nothing when it comes to winning battles or wars. Just ask the Russians and Ukrainians about that. History is replete with battles and wars won by numerically smaller or less advantaged forces. The PRC cannot invade without an amphibious attack which they have nowhere remotely a large enough or capable enough force to carry out.

            Look up any and all of the successful amphibious invasions in history and they were all performed with vastly larger forces than the PRC has, with the victors having absolute control of both air and sea which the PRC cannot field or carry out.

            You can yack all you like about the PRC’s bigness, and it does not matter at all.

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  9. R. James

    Strategic ambiguity on whether or not the US will defend Taiwan will not serve strategic end goals going forward. The strategic landscape has changed significantly in the last fifteen years. Given the socio-economic obstacles facing China's growth this century, Xi's Chinese Dream ideology and the CCP's political promises it's made to the people of China for 2049; there will be mounting pressure for China to strike while the iron is hot and force a reunification in the short to mid-term. If China perceives that the US is unwilling to come to Taiwan's defense, then it will invade. There is no credible deterrence without a credible defense of Taiwan plan. If China seizes Taiwan by force against the US's efforts or objection, then China will make a credible claim to global leadership, regional hegemony and a bi-polar world order. I.E. The end to the Bretton-Woods world order as we know it. Taiwan and the US have a lot of ground to make up with very little time. There is no room for half measures on defense preparedness and military funding to Taiwan. That being said, if the US can avoid merely symbolic diplomatic stances that will only serve to provoke China in the short term without any benefit to defense of Taiwan, then it should avoid those diplomatic provocations and buy time.

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    Peter_Shalen

    Here we go again. Taiwan is a "self-governing, democratic island." Can you really not bring yourselves to say that Taiwan is a country? Are you afraid of offending the delicate sensibilities of the Chinese government?

    I've commented on this before. Even Wiki effin pedia refers to Taiwan as a country. Why do you feel the need to be more revoltingly woke than Wiki effin pedia?

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    1. Duane Truitt

      Correct. The appropriate term is the Republic of China - one of the oldest republics in Asia. No matter how much that pisses off the ChiComs, truth matters.

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