Killing Zawahiri: How the CIA Hunts Monsters

Hello, and happy Thursday. 

Unless you live under a rock, you know the CIA successfully killed al-Qaeda leader Ayman al-Zawahiri over the weekend in Kabul, Afghanistan. Zawahiri was evil. He was a mass murderer responsible for the deaths of thousands of Americans and of thousands more innocents—including fellow Muslims—around the world. It was Zawahiri’s book, Knights Under the Prophet’s Banner, that argued that violent jihad against the enemies of Islam is the individual responsibility of every true believer, and not just the responsibility of Islamic governments. This laid the foundation of al-Qaeda and of the countless atrocities its members have and will commit. My theology says this man’s current state is too terrible to contemplate, and so I’m slow to say that I’m “happy” for his death. However, Zawahiri made his choices, and I believe our government’s killing of him was just.

And that’s what I want us to talk about this week—the process of killing Zawahiri. Not to indulge a morbid fascination or to gloat over a fallen enemy. But to explain how our government wields the sword of justice in the fight against terrorism. But, before going further, I should say that I have no special information on the specific operation to take out Zawahiri. While at one point I was the Defense Intelligence Agency’s lead analyst for al-Qaeda senior leadership, I’ve been out of that game for a long time. I’m reading the same information in the press that you are. But I do have insight into these events, and this brings me to my second caveat: The description below is a general one. There are details that I am omitting and deliberately leaving opaque to protect intelligence sources and methods. This is important because we need the CIA to remain effective in hunting our enemies.

Having said all of that, I’d like to walk you through the authorities, the process, and the technology of killing Zawahiri. 

The Authorities

The CIA enjoys unique legal authorities to conduct lethal intelligence operations under Title 50 of the U.S. Code. These operations fall under the agency’s authorization of covert action, “an activity or activities of the United States Government to influence political, economic, or military conditions abroad, where it is intended that the role of the United States will not be apparent or acknowledged publicly.” This doesn’t mean our government cannot acknowledge its actions (we obviously have in the case of Zawahiri), only that it is not required to do so.

The president is also granted the authority to kill Zawahiri under the Authorization for Use of Military Force (AUMF) that was passed as a joint resolution of Congress on September 18, 2001. The AUMF grants the president the authority to employ all “necessary and appropriate force” against those who “planned, authorized, committed or aided” the 9/11 attacks. While there are legitimate debates on how broadly this AUMF should and has been applied, there’s no doubt that it applies to the former al-Qaeida leader. But if you want to think about this more, here’s a good analysis.

These are the primary legal authorities for killing Zawahiri, now let’s turn to how we went about doing it.

The Process

For more than 20 years, the CIA has been trying to find Zawahiri and, while we have refined this type of man-hunting to an art, it is an inherently difficult task. Consider the case of Eric Rudolph, the man who bombed the 1996 Summer Olympics in Atlanta and multiple abortion clinics over an 18-month period. Rudolph was eventually arrested in Murphy, North Carolina, after successfully hiding in the state’s Nantahala National Forest for nearly five years. Think about that: It took the U.S. government half a decade to track down a man in an area where the government has total freedom of movement, where it is supported by the local population, and where the fugitive enjoys very little support. The case of Zawahiri is exactly the opposite: U.S. freedom of movement in Afghanistan and Pakistan has always been constrained, its support among the local population has always been tenuous, and the al-Qaeda leader has always enjoyed popular and logistical support within the communities in which he was hiding. This helps explain why it took more than two decades to find Zawahiri.

But, according to press reports, we had a breakthrough earlier this year when U.S. intelligence was tipped off that Zawahiri’s wife, daughter, and grandchildren were relocating to a house in the Sherpur neighborhood of Kabul. This intelligence could have come from our own human and technical collection, from the collection of another government, or even from the Taliban or another terrorist group. It’s unclear. Whatever the case, we know the information was deemed sufficiently credible that the CIA began monitoring the house in the hopes that Zawahiri either had already, or soon would, join his family.

Typically, when we think we may have “actionable” intelligence on a senior terrorist leader—especially one with the stature of Zawahiri—a couple of things happen. First, a small team of experts within the agency’s Counterterrorism Mission Center (CTMC), formerly the Counterterrorism Center (CTC), are dedicated to vetting the new intelligence, tasking new intelligence collection to verify this reporting, and to begin developing operational options for a “kill/capture” mission. This “intelligence cell” will include experts on Zawahiri and on al-Qaeda more broadly, as well as collection and targeting specialists from the CIA and other intelligence agencies. This work will occur exclusively within “operational” channels, meaning it will be highly compartmentalized and will not be discussed in “finished” intelligence reports, and it’s not uncommon for the team and its information to be physically isolated to further enhance security.

Priority one is confirming the presence of Zawahiri, preferably through multiple sources of intelligence. To do this, a comprehensive net of intelligence collection is dropped over the target location, which is observed 24 hours a day. Imagery platforms look for glimpses of the terrorist leader. Signals collection blankets the area in hopes of hearing someone talk about “the guest,” “the old man,” or some other coded language. Human assets are tasked to scope out the area, look for clues of Zawahiri’s presence, and to gather specific details on the house itself—how many doors, how many windows, which way do they open, from what materials is the house built, etc. The goal is to know everything that is knowable about the house, its inhabitants, and its surroundings. All this data is rolled into a series of intelligence reports, operational plans, and even a physical model that is an exact replica of the house down to the smallest detail. 

We know from press reporting these efforts eventually led the CIA to conclude that Zawahiri was in the house and that they briefed these findings to Deputy National Security Adviser Jon Finer and Homeland Security adviser Liz Sherwood-Randall in April. It’s not uncommon for these briefings to result in further intelligence and analysis taskings, often focused on clarifying ambiguities and assessing the impact of removing the leader of al-Qaeda. Policymakers will rightly want to understand how Zawahiri’s removal would affect the terrorist group, the situation in Afghanistan, and the terrorist threat to the U.S. homeland. Eventually the agency’s findings were briefed to National Security Adviser Jake Sullivan, who then informed President Biden. Two things likely happened soon thereafter.

First, a formal briefing would be arranged for the president. This meeting would normally include the director of national intelligence, the director of the CIA, the president’s national security adviser, and possibly other Cabinet officials and national security personnel. A representative from the intelligence cell may be invited to the briefing, but this is determined by the president’s preferences and other factors like scheduling. It’s at this briefing that Biden likely would have been shown the model of the home and walked through the intelligence in detail. He would also have given guidance on what operational options he’d like to consider and, according to the Washington Post, Biden instructed his advisers “to take all possible measures to ensure that if they launched a strike, only Zawahiri would be killed.”

As these operational options were developed, another group of intelligence professionals would have been brought in to review the Zawahiri intelligence and analysis and tasked with developing or ruling out alternative analytic conclusions. This is standard procedure and a critical lesson learned from the intelligence failures leading up to the 2003 war in Iraq. A group of agency and White House lawyers would also pore over the intelligence in order to determine its suitability as a justification for lethal action. This is when legal i’s are dotted, and t’s are crossed. All of this appears to have occurred between June and July.

Eventually a final meeting would be held at the White House where any remaining questions are answered and where, in this case, the president orders the CIA to conduct the mission. Very quickly after this, all operational and legal arrangements are finalized and the CIA director assumes operational control, typically within an “ops center” at Langley. From here CIA Director William J. Burns will have overseen the final target acquisition, engagement, and elimination, with the president, his national security advisers, and possibly others able to watch in real-time from the White House. Efforts to confirm Zawahiri’s death through multiple intelligence channels will begin immediately, and a final after-action assessment will be prepared and provided to the White House.

So, these are the broad outlines of how the CIA develops and executes a lethal operation against a high-value terrorist leader. But the technical aspects of the Zawahiri killing are also interesting and worth a brief discussion.

The Technology

I’m not going to talk about our intelligence collection capabilities. Instead, I’ll focus this section on the specific technology used to kill Zawahiri—namely the drone and the missile. 

It has been publicly reported that the CIA maintains a fleet of armed unmanned aircraft. Among these aircraft is reportedly a variant of General Atomics’ Predator drone, called the MQ-9 “Reaper.” According to its manufacturer, the Reaper system includes a sensor/weapon-equipped aircraft, a ground control station, a Predator primary satellite link (the thing that allows the drone to be remotely piloted), and spare equipment. The drone is typically piloted by one person with another person in charge of the aircraft’s sensors and weapons. Placed throughout the drone is a multi-spectral targeting system that includes infrared sensors, color, monochrome daylight TV camera, shortwave infrared camera, a laser designator for guiding bombs, and a laser illuminator. Each of these sensors can be viewed as independent streams or they can be fused into a single, multi-spectral image that makes it very difficult for bad guys to hide. Bottom line: This thing is called the “Reaper” for a reason.

The MQ-9 can carry a range of ordnance, including the AGM-114 Hellfire missile. The three most common variants of this missile include a dual-warhead, shaped-charge anti-tank missile (AGM-114K); a blast fragmentation warhead for “soft targets” (AGM-114M); and, a metal-augmented charge warhead for larger targets like bridges, bunkers, and urban structures (AGM-114N). None of these variants appear to have been used to kill Zawahiri. Instead, it appears the CIA used a newly developed Hellfire missile called the R9X—aka, the “ninja bomb.”

Unlike other variants, the R9X has no explosive warhead. Instead, as it enters the terminal phase of its flight, six metal blades deploy close to the nosecone and begin to spin. These spinning blades help to cut through cars, walls, and other objects that may protect the intended target. The bomb is relatively light at just 100 pounds, but it travels at 995 mph, which means the target feels like it’s been hit by a small car flying at Mach 1.3. All of this combines into a very deadly weapon that crushes and kills its target while minimizing the risk of collateral death and damage from things like fire, explosive overpressure, and structural collapse.

Development of the ninja bomb reportedly began in 2011, and it was first deployed in 2017. Since then, it is thought that it has been used only a half dozen times. 

These two systems formed a deadly duo on Sunday when the Reaper’s sensors allowed the CIA to positively identify Zawahiri, designate him as a target, and then fire two R9X missiles that obliterated the terrorist leader without further casualties. Technologically speaking, it was flawless.

Final Thoughts

I don’t think we should dance on the graves of our enemies, but neither do I feel compelled to apologize or to explain away our effort to kill him. He was evil and dangerous, and I’m confident he’d kill your family and mine as soon as look at them. The world is safer without him.

I also appreciate the “long memory” of the United States. While this idea is almost cliché, the fact is that those who might seek to do us harm should think twice, perhaps even a third time, because we’ve proved over and over again that we will not forget. And behind this is an even more important reality—a massive intelligence enterprise filled with patriots who dedicate their lives to protecting ours. Even in the wake of years of being publicly vilified, these selfless men and women kept their heads down and finished this mission. 

Finally, our restraint should also be noted and celebrated. Not only did we spend millions of dollars developing a missile specifically made NOT to kill anyone but the intended target, but we even constrained ourselves to a robust intelligence development process that included protections for—wait for it—the family of the man who was partially responsible for killing thousands of our own men, women, and children. You can be sure that Russia would not have spent months trying to verify its target. Putin would simply bomb the whole block and shrug if it was later determined that he’d missed his intended victim. Certainly our hands are not completely clean when it comes to civilian casualties, but war often will not allow clean hands—that’s one of the reasons it is such a terrible enterprise. But no other nation exercises anything close to the restraint that we routinely show, even when hunting down one of the most notorious killers of the 21st century. Our nation is good, and that goodness is shown even in how we kill.

Ayman al-Zawahiri attacked the United States and killed our people. This weekend, we held him accountable, and Americans can take pride in both our delivery of that justice and the way in which it was delivered. 

 That’s it for this edition of The Current. Be sure to comment on this post and to share this newsletter with your family, friends, and followers. You can also follow me on Twitter (@KlonKitchen). Thanks for taking the time and I’ll see you next week!