A Sign That Iran Is Still Pursuing Nukes

Iranian media have reported on the identity of the new head of the Islamic Republic’s nuclear research institute.

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Personnel is policy, even in nuclear weapons programs that purport not to exist. 

On November 13, Iranian media outlets revealed the name of the new director of the Organization of Defensive Innovation and Research, an entity known by its Persian-language acronym, “SPND.” Created in 2011 to support Tehran’s restructured nuclear weapons quest, SPND was led by Mohsen Fakhrizadeh-Mahabadi, the Islamic Republic’s foremost military-nuclear scientist, from its founding until his death last November. The continued existence, operation, and staffing of SPND is a testament to Tehran’s ongoing interest in at least a nuclear weapons option, if not an actual weapon.

The name of SPND’s new chief, Reza Mozaffarinia, was not trumpeted in a formal press release, but rather relayed in passing amid a story unrelated to Iran’s nuclear program first detected by open-source analysts. The reason for the lackluster press is understandable. Mozaffarinia’s predecessor was targeted and killed last November in what many assume to be an Israeli attempt to stymie Tehran’s nuclear weapons efforts. In the years leading up to his death, Fakhrizadeh’s name appeared in International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) reports, books, articles, and even the atomic archive that Israel exposed in 2018, all of which put Fakhrizadeh at the nexus of Iran’s nuclear and military aspirations. 

At the time of this writing, it is unknown how soon after Fakhirzadeh’s death Mozaffarinia assumed his new role. This September for example, the Iranian press announced a new deputy minister of defense, Brig. Gen. Seyyed Mehdi Farahi. Some outlets reported that Gen. Farahi formerly served as the head of SPND, while others allege that he held the title of SPND chief while serving as deputy defense minister. In both instances, no timeline was offered, making it unclear whether the conflation in Farahi’s résumé is the result of a disinformation operation or reporting mistake. What is clear today however, is that several Iranian media outlets report Mozaffarinia as the chief of SPND. Accordingly, Mozaffarinia’s background is worth understanding. As Western powers again pin their hopes on resurrecting the 2015 Iran nuclear deal, Mozaffarinia’s service in a string of sanctioned entities tied to Iran’s military and nuclear programs still in operation remains cause for concern.

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  1. Avatar photo
    Ben Connelly

    At this point maybe the only thing that will save the world from a nuclear Iran is going to be some serious Israeli clandestine operations.

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  2. Avatar photo
    Paul Reichardt

    Not quite sure what the point of the article is. The chief Iranian civilian nuclear scientist was assassinated to slow Iran’s nuclear program, but we get past the acronyms and technocratic language to learn he was replaced by someone with a similar resume, military industrial experience, and ability and their nuclear enrichment program continued apace barely breaking stride.

    Just this week, WSJ reported similar news that Iran resumed enrichment at the Karaj facility that had been damaged (allegedly, but likely in reality) by remote Israeli sabotage proving that that didn’t work either.
    https://www.haaretz.com/middle-east-news/iran/report-iran-resumes-production-of-advanced-centrifuges-at-top-secret-nuclear-site-1.10391465

    The Haaretz article gives a helpful recap: “Earlier this month, Iran’s atomic agency said that its stockpile of 20-percent enriched uranium had reached over 210 kilograms (463 pounds). Under the historic 2015 nuclear deal between Iran and the World Powers, Iran was not meant to enrich uranium above 3.67 percent.”

    So, in other words, under the JCPOA we were under 3.67%, as verified by the IAEA and US national intelligence assessment, but with the Trump/Biden no-deal + maximum pressure policy—most vocally promoted and developed by the FDD—in place with Israeli lawn-mowing operations, we now have 500 lbs @ 20% (and a less massive chuck at >60% U-235.) Iran should be a screwdriver-turn-away nuclear threshold state by next summer at this rate and then we live with it. Negotiations will pick up again in earnest, but “always negotiate from a position of strength” likely has a Persian equivalent and the US would be lucky to get back even to the 2015 agreement at this point.

    The authors will probably get their wish that Biden will abandon his JCPOA-centric approach, but only because that ship has likely sailed and Biden lacks the political will and capital to reverse course.

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  3. Alex DeLarge

    75 years ago we built a nuclear bomb from scratch in about 30 months. All the technology is 100% known and only needs to be executed. In light of these facts, there is something fundamentally wrong with the narrative that Iran has been working diligently for 20 years to get a bomb and is always right on the verge of doing so. Just sayin'.

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