The Trump Administration Still Wants a Deal With the Taliban. Why?

The group lies blatantly about its ties to al-Qaeda. It can’t be trusted.

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It is no secret that the Trump administration is looking to withdraw more forces from Afghanistan, where there are reportedly 12,000 to 13,000 American troops stationed. There is mounting bipartisan pressure to extricate the U.S. from the so-called “endless wars.” And the president’s own desire to end, or at least greatly reduce, the American presence is well-known. But even if the goal is to withdraw from the Afghan war, it still matters how the U.S. goes about it.

Recently, White House national security adviser Robert O’Brien told Axios that while it is still possible the U.S. could do a deal with the Taliban, America’s military footprint may be reduced without one. “We’re working on it. But it has to be a good deal,” O’Brien said.

There’s just one problem: There is no good reason to think a good deal with al-Qaeda’s blood brothers can be had. After years of feckless on-again, off-again talks, the Taliban hasn’t shown any willingness to enter into true peace negotiations with the Afghan government. Instead, the jihadists are biding their time and extracting concessions from the Americans, whose time may be running out, while giving up little in return. 

Last year, Secretary of State Mike Pompeo’s team put together a draft accord in which the Taliban would act as America’s de facto counterterrorism partner. The State Department hasn’t been forthcoming when it comes to the specifics of this arrangement. But Special Representative Zalmay Khalilzad was quick to publicly endorse the Taliban’s supposed counterterrorism assurances. “The Taliban have committed, to our satisfaction, to do what is necessary that would prevent Afghanistan from ever becoming a platform for international terrorist groups or individuals,” Khalilzad told the New York Times in January 2019. Although Khalilzad said the details still had to be worked out, the State Department was curiously eager to treat the Taliban as a responsible stakeholder.

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  1. Avatar photo
    Earl King

    This is one that I say a pox on both their houses. Not one politician has the courage to sat this is a multi-generational war with no end in site. Much like Vietnam Nam we have to decide if this is terrorist country bent on destroying America or a civil war amount it’s citizens. Vietnam was a bone headed miscalculation by LBJ and JFK. We need to get this one right.

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    Jason

    Well done Thomas.

    We have two options, this has been clear since at least late 2007, when we shored up the Pakistani government as the TTP rolled into Swat and everyone started saying "AfPak."

    The first option is to rewrite the entire security architecture of the sub-continent. Big chess pieces. We could potentially do that by sustaining an extremely heavy regional presence and be willing to confront Pakistan militarily if they don't stop their support of these groups, not just the ones operating in Afghanistan, but in their own territory. This would involve aggressive airstrikes and being willing to have close calls with the Pakistani air force escalate into open confrontation. Further, it might actually take some sort of limited confrontation with Pakistan, with the end result unclear.

    So,
    1) fill the vacuum that this particular radical "ism" flowed into for another X years
    2) reorient Pakistan's entire national security outlook and structure such that they see the US as a bigger threat than India (nearly impossible, but achievable)

    Absent that, we risk another 9/11-style attack on a long enough timeline at worst and are committing to a presence for another generation at best (presuming the Taliban don't eventually try to move on Kabul X years from now).

    So Option 2 is some version of the post-2001 approach, with at least a small footprint into perpetuity and young American men and women risking their lives for a forgotten war. The pinprick "smart war" strategy will not prevent the territorial gains that precede mature attack planning, however, and so the risk of a mature attack even given our current posture is not minimal.

    There is not another way out of this, it's one of those two for the next 10-20 years.

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    1. Avatar photo
      Ed

      I am not particularly knowledgeable, but.... It seems that the tumultuous and tribal character of the Afghans that hampers us could be just as useful after we left. Let the Taliban play whack-a-mole instead of us. It seems like we ought to be able to keep them so busy staying in control that they can't poke their nose out of their own country.

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    Ed

    If we accept that the Taliban cannot be trusted, but upon the departure of the US will inevitably rule Afghanistan, what remains? The logic of departure is difficult to deny: our continued presence is expensive and resented pretty much on all fronts. We should go. Why not work toward making Afghanistan as ungovernable for the Taliban as they have made it for the current Afghani government? If we cannot wipe out the infection, why not contain it? As past experience has confirmed guerrilla wars are cheap to finance and often effective.

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    1. Avatar photo
      Jason

      Good point here re containment. I think of our current strategy as a limited quarantine approach.

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  4. Avatar photo
    Paul Montagu

    In short, there are no "good Taliban". They won't disassociate from al Qaeda or the Islamic State, and they won't believably renounce terrorism.
    The best we can do, IMO, is help hold the current Afghan government together, train Afghan forces, and use Spec Ops to kill Taliban where we can find them, all with using as few US fighters as possible.

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