President Donald Trump wants a lasting peace in Europe after Russia’s war against Ukraine. And he also wants the United States to remain the world’s superpower, and for NATO to be stronger, not weaker. To help secure those goals, the United States must remain the leader of the NATO alliance. But there are reports that new advisers inside the Pentagon are advocating for the president to surrender a key U.S. military role, that of Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR). This would make the U.S. less powerful, render it less influential with European forces, and increase the risk of deterrence failure.
When America assumed its place as leader of NATO, President Harry Truman appointed Gen. Dwight D. Eisenhower as the alliance’s first SACEUR. After America fought alongside the Allies to liberate Europe, its hand at the helm at SACEUR visibly demonstrated its commitment to preserving the peace in Europe—and, more specifically, its indispensable role as the ultimate security guarantor of the alliance’s nuclear weapons. The SACEUR determines the overall direction of the military alliance, and plans and directs all NATO military operations. This American four-star general is also the Commander of U.S. European Command, and he is physically located in Mons, Belgium, at the Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe (SHAPE).
American control of the SACEUR position has not only been good for Europe, it has also been good for the United States: It has contributed to fostering the peace necessary for governments and societies to devote time to human flourishing, productivity, and commerce. Other Europeans might want to take over the role (as French President Emmanuel Macron periodically volunteers to), but no country has the kind of influence—economic, military, diplomatic, moral—as the United States, and this remains true even in an age of chest-thumping “realism” trending toward cynicism. The United States remains the coalescing force in the Alliance, the only nation in the world with the hard-earned ability to drive consensus across disparate democratic nations to counter shared adversaries. The most effective way to push for even more contributions from allies, adapt locations and numbers of military forces and capabilities, and make a more credible and effective integrated NATO military architecture is keeping the SACEUR position in American hands, not vacating it and submitting American forces to the command of a European officer. The United States gets nothing by handing over this power, but it does court disaster.
Of course, it is true that American security backing has also had the unintended consequence of allowing Europeans to get overly comfortable. Some European capitals, under the protection of the United States, have audaciously made deals with Russia for cheap oil, effectively funding Russian President Vladimir Putin’s war machine. Other countries have heavily invested in social welfare programs at the expense of defense spending. Trump has urged Europeans to do more to share the burden of the alliance’s funding, and new advisers in this second Trump administration may think giving up SACEUR would force the Europeans to do more.
But there has already been progress on that front without going to such drastic measures. Of the 32 countries in the NATO alliance, 23 now invest at least 2 percent of their gross domestic product in defense, a NATO target that many countries consistently fell short of. At the outset of Trump’s first term, just seven countries—including the United States—met that target.
Russia’s invasion of Ukraine has tested NATO. But it’s also led Finland and Sweden to join the alliance, and motivated the European Union to increase defense spending dramatically. But Putin’s gamble could still very well pay off for Moscow, depending on the Trump administration’s next steps—how it leads peace negotiations between Russia and Ukraine and shapes the European security architecture going forward.
Even the most reliably pro-American European countries like Poland are questioning if the Trump administration really does want to make NATO stronger like it claims. Abandoning the SACEUR role would only further validate these concerns, likely cementing European Union plans to pivot away from U.S. defense manufacturers and toward rebuilding the bloc’s own defense capabilities. The 27 EU nations have placed about two-thirds of their orders with U.S. defense companies in recent years, and that percentage falling would mean not only an economic hit for the United States, but less control over supply chains and logistics.
With the United States facilitating negotiations between Russia and Ukraine—and encouraging European allies to invest more in their own defense—we cannot afford the signal that voluntarily surrendering our SACEUR leadership role would send. Just as the Trump administration has encouraged allies to decouple from Russian energy and to rearm, it must now work to strengthen and improve NATO’s military architecture—not undermine American influence in the alliance and weaken its cohesion.
If Trump wants to be a peacemaker, he should stick with the plan to make NATO stronger: We can use the aggregate strength of our European allies to deter further Russian aggression, even as the United States makes big moves to counter China. And he can do that best when an American is sitting in the Command chair.
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