Failure in Afghanistan

In this episode, Steve moderates a conversation with David French and Tom Joscelyn about the ...

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In this episode, Steve moderates a conversation with David French and Tom Joscelyn about the ongoing crisis in Afghanistan. They cover the Biden administration’s decision not to begin evacuations before the Taliban captured Kabul, intelligence failures, the state of the Afghan military, and much, much more.

Show Notes:

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  1. Avatar photo
    Ben Connelly

    This was excellent. Would love a follow up discussion between these three gentlemen about Taiwan.

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  2. Mary Stine

    The Trump admin "deal" with the Taliban always struck me as having a Mae West moment potential: witless dude "but I thought we had a gentleman's agreement?!!" Mae West-"Yeah, we did, but I'm no gentleman!"

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  3. Rob

    Must reading, I think

    https://www.sarahchayes.org/post/the-ides-of-august

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    Dave

    Wow. I don’t agree with every conclusion he reaches (although I do agree with most), but I have heard NOBODY speak with more a more well informed, intellectually honest voice than Tom. Thanks for this.

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  5. Brooklyn Expat

    Steve, great conversation. One question I didn't hear: will Russia or China recognize the Taliban? If so, how would that play out in terms of US counterterrorism efforts?

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    1. Brooklyn Expat

      And I missed the last couple minutes without realizing it. Tom and David did answer the question!

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    Rajeev

    What exactly do the dispatch main contributors consider victory in Afghanistan? Several of them have used that term but I'm not sure if it is consistent across the board or even if it is well-defined. Yet they still have a habit of at least sometimes using that term.

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  7. Icarus213

    David says something starting at 30:57 that made me sit up:

    "One thing I will note - and look, you know, I don't claim to have conducted a scientific survey of the distinction between Iraq vets and Afghanistan vets - but I will say this: in my experience, the folks I served with who served in Afghanistan were considerably more disillusioned by their experience than the people I served with in Iraq. That, almost without exception."

    My career was almost identical to David's - in a different branch of the Army, but an Army officer who served in Iraq about the same time (mid 2000s). And I didn't really think to notice this until I just heard him say it, because this has been my experience as well. He says this in response to Tom's indictment of the military leadership, so I suppose he agrees that it was the leaders who made the bad decisions, and nothing inherent to the nature of the wars themselves.

    I suppose this could totally be true, although it makes me wonder why the difference between the two countries. Many generals who led divisions in one theatre went back to be Corps commanders in the other theatre. Was it because ISIS was a much less organic force in Iraq, so once defeated they pretty much collapsed? Many ISIS fighters came from other countries and then went back home after the fall of Rawah in 2017. But the Taliban is a home grown enemy, so it can't ever really leave?

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    1. jmk789

      I think you're right. The US constantly rotates troops and leaders (there were something like over a dozen US generals in charge of Afghanistan), which is understandable but leads to knowledge gaps and makes it hard to build long-term personal relationships at the ground level. The Taliban would do things like marry into the local tribes (sometimes forced, but often voluntary) and many of them were, in fact, members of local tribes themselves. It's a pretty strong signal that they're there to stay.

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    Eric "Otter" Stratton


    I would love Tom’s thoughts on the mild success of the resistance in Panjshir. Also I’m beginning the think the Taliban is the dog that caught the car. They conquered the country so quickly it seems like they are struggling to contain urban areas where the democratic values took hold. The protest we see now never would have happened in the 90s. I hope their focus on trying to “govern” gives the resistance a chance. We are pulling for the new Lions of Panjshir

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  9. linda

    Give it up for The Dispatch.......again.

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  10. Avatar photo
    E7a56c3893

    I want to echo everyone else's admiration for Tom's work and expertise on all things Afghanistan. Out of the many outlets and news sources that I am reading, and I am not even a close follower of Vital Interests, I feel I have learned more from him than from any other source in the past year. Very outstanding work.

    If you Tom, or any other person incredibly familiar with the situation in Afghanistan can offer any thoughts on my personal theory here (for which I have no proof, just my general impression as a non expert): the fall of the Afghan government was not a disorderly affair, but to the contrary an incredibly orderly, orchestrated affair. My basic thesis here is that the Biden Administration set the stage for a rapid collapse and transfer of weapons/power to the Taliban as a precondition for *minimal* death among Afghan allies, politicians and US personnel, at least during the pull out. Here is my reasoning for why:

    1) Biden offered a remarkably early withdrawal date, and not too soon long after the Taliban executed it's blitzkrieg to control peripheral regions to set the stage for attacks on the provincial capitols. The weakness in my theory here would be the death count during this blitzkrieg though if indeed the majority of the deaths were Afghan special forces, I think they would be uniquely among those who would not abide any orders by Afghan leadership to stand down.

    2) The Taliban, for a very long while, has had enough political leverage to make any US President's political prospects very dim with something as simple as a military invasion. Megan McCardle offered an interesting theory that Biden wants to do the pullout as early as possible to put as much distance between Afghanistan and the mid-term elections.

    3) The Taliban is in need of weaponry. In addition, the Taliban (under the status quo) was ready and willing to fight a very bloody war against the US-aligned government until victory. Since the Taliban's political project is confined specifically to Afghanistan and not a global jihad against the west, the Biden Administration seems to think that giving them the weapons for minimized political damage was a sufficiently good deal to make.

    4) I have seen some rumblings in online forums that many in the Afghan military did not desert, but were *ordered* to stand down and lay down their weapons by their own commanders/civil authority. The reporting in the mainstream media that many Afghan officers threw down their arms in fear I think does not tell the whole story about how exactly the civil government unraveled. I would not be surprised if many government officials, both at the provincial and national level, expressed clear signals a lack of will to resist the inevitable, and that officers were encouraged to think for themselves and their families while there was still the chance

    5) Like many have stated, Trump's signing of the peace deal had locked Biden into an increasingly small time table in which he had to either: pull out with some plausible argument to head blame on the Afghan governement/military (again with a deal with the Taliban that they would minimize casualties during the pullout), or suffer the wrath of a bloodthirsty Taliban who would spare no Afghan politician, officer or US personnel.

    6) I *seriously* doubt Biden, or any other US military official in leadership did not see this coming, given Taliban's control of basically half of Afghanistan by the April announcement. I believe that this quick collapse was well understood months ago and that Biden and all the leakers in the Pentagon/State Department are trying their best to distribute and minimize blame.

    7) The fleeing of the Afghan president was quick and not stopped by anyone in the international community, giving me the impression that his departure was understood, foreseen and necessary for the quick collapse of the Afghan government.

    These are my preliminary thoughts, bordering on conspiracy theory, but one that I think makes sense given the circumstances. One weakness is, as Steve said, there are still US personnel trapped in Afghanistan. But, and I think many here will disagree strongly with what I am about to say, but I think the Taliban's primary concern is completing their coronation of power and instituting a national framework for their Islamic Fundamentalism—NOT to wage war on the US (though I grant that they will unapologetically maintain relations with Al Qaeda because of their aligned religious world view, and possible utility in fighting off ISIS). The Taliban does not strike me as the kind of political force that is looking outward right now, but rather inward.

    What do you all think?

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    1. Mary Stine

      You and Tom Jocelyn have given voice to many of my musings about this over the last 10 years .
      However, I would never trust any government based on fanatical authoritarian beliefs. Those governments depend on having a deeply hated enemy and when all the enemies within have been extinguished, a replacement must be found outside. The Taliban already has that outside scapegoat..the US.
      The Taliban claim that they are "just enforcing true Islam" is a convenient lie..they are enforcing the most narrow and rigid version possible that allows the most cruelty in order to hold power. Islam seems just a tool for the Taliban leaders, not a faith.
      Evil never sleeps.

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