Ukraine Is Not World War III

To act as though it is could trigger the very war we should most want to avoid.

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War gets the blood up. Gary Kasparov—former world chess champion turned dissident against Putin’s Russia—claimed on March 3 that “this is already World War III.”

“Putin started it long ago & Ukraine is only the current front,” Kasparov argued. He will escalate anyway, and it’s even more likely if he succeeds in destroying Ukraine because you have again convinced him you won’t stop him even though you could.”

Kasparov has warned about Putin’s aggression for years, and his book Winter Is Coming largely predicted what we’re witnessing today. But sayijeng we are already fighting World War III is the classic never-appease-aggressors logic by which any authoritarian is likened to Hitler in 1939: if we don’t stop him now, he will only be emboldened to invade the next country, and the next, until he is knocking on our front door with an armored division or two. Better to accept reality and start World War III now than wait for Putin to initiate it and force us to fight it on his terms.

The logic is familiar and the danger is plain, which is why some people seem more willing to risk general war against Russia in an all-out effort to stop Putin now, before he invades the next country. Kasparov’s argument has been echoed by other commentators who warn Putin will not stop at Ukraine, or who insist the U.S. and NATO must militarily intervene in the war in Ukraine. The head of the European Council on Foreign Relations openly called for regime change in Russia. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky called on NATO to impose a no-fly zone over Ukraine, an idea former National Security Adviser John Bolton partially endorsed. A no-fly zone, of course, would involve NATO aircraft shooting down Russian warplanes over Ukrainian skies. To put it plainly: A no-fly zone is a declaration of war against Russia and the first step on a path that would lead to general war.

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  1. Christopher Shafik

    Great essay! I wonder if your argument would change as Putin continues to hit civilian targets?

    We also ought to consider the role of accepting Ukrainian refugees as both a strategic move and a humanitarian move. It is the right thing to do: Give people the option to fit AND escape. And strategically, it takes some pressure off our allies. I just understand that is logically difficult to do.

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    Andrew

    I missed this piece earlier, glad I found it today.

    I do worry that current strategists, like much of the general public I suspect, have forgotten or are dismissive of the nuclear variable.

    Anyone wishing more on this topic, I would recommend the book Destroying the Village by Campbell Craig. Short but detailed history of nuclear strategy during the Eisenhower years. It gets to the crux of the argument in this piece and details Ike's clever strategy of avoidance.

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    Theirn Scott

    So, a couple of hours ago, say around 8 PM EST a report comes that U.S. Intelligence has determined that Putin has concluded that "this is a war he (Putin) cannot afford to lose." Hmmm

    I like your reminder of how nuclear deterrence works. As someone who remembers the Cuban Missile Crisis, it should be burned in my brain. But I'd like to juxtapose your analysis with an interview with General Wesley Clarke over the weekend. General Clarke made a comment about how when Russia did their war game exercises, they always ended with Russia launching a tactical nuke and NATO laying down their arms. He didn't say this, but I conclude that Russia must be "losing" the conventional (mock) battle which forces them to launch the tactical nuke(s).

    If this scenario is still Russian military dogma, does that change your analysis??

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    Adam Bridge

    Related question: how direct can our supplying of intelligence be to the Ukrainian military? I understand we have an issue with revealing methods, etc so some data can't get there in real time. But, suppose we have an AWACS orbiting just beyond the Ukrainian border. Can we directly radio the status of Russian aircraft? If we do does that AWACS become a target for the Russians?

    Who "owns" Ukrainian airspace at this point? I don't mean controls I mean who legally controls it? What I'm getting at is: if the Russians shoot down a NATO aircraft in Ukrainian airspace are they going to claim it's violating Russian territory? Has there been a claim of annexation?

    I think having an article to describe this would be useful.

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  5. Ben Bobbitt

    I have to agree with Professor Miller on this one, as I suspect most of us do. It is not a straightforward issue of “intervene and save Ukraine” because our direct intervention would likely lead to *more* destruction both in Ukraine and everywhere else.
    I fear that we are soon to see this logic played out between Israel and Iran, as again we seem poised to pretend that Iran can be trusted and for all intents and purposes green light their nuclear program. Israel, one suspects, will take seriously such a threat to their existence and attempt to preempt that capability. If they do, lets hope it really is before Iran has a nuke.

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    David Eggleston

    Tell Moldova that Putin doesn’t want to invade another country.

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  7. Pohl

    I agree with this article, but just last week you said we’ve basically declared “economic war” on Russia (and should proactively apply much of the same to China). Since Putin seems to be saying some of our measures are declarations of war, full stop, what criterion are you using to tell when his retaliatory threats are urgently worrisome for NATO? Can we prudently avoid escalation by doing all to support Ukraine and sanction Russia while simply refraining from pulling a trigger?

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      Adam Bridge

      There's a difference between kinetic action and economic action.

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      1. Pohl

        Yes, I said Putin is pretending not to know this. It’s also quite a fine point when they become crippling. It’s in the eye of the beholder to some extent.

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  8. Kreskij

    Fiona Miller believes that it is WW III. She seems to have more expertise than Mr. Miller. The reality is we may not know the answer to whether this escalates for several months

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    1. Kreskij

      * Fiona Hill

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  9. R. James

    I agree with the conclusion that the US should not go to war with Russia over Ukraine, and that a No Fly Zone will likely result in such a war. However, I think a lot of the underlying assumptions about Putin's strategic ends and his assumptions about Western resolve are flawed. You cannot easily hand waive the Hitler-Putin comparison away. Putin may not want to conquer all of Europe, but he certainly wants to re-conquer all of the former SSR countries and client states. That's pretty much all of Eastern Europe, and it includes current NATO members. Putin left little doubt of these strategic ends in his speech last month and his messaging to Eastern European and Scandinavian states over the past several weeks left little to the imagination. Putin certainly lacks the means to accomplish this goal but that does not mean he will not try. He arguably lacks the means to conquer and hold Ukraine in the face of a long term insurgency. But he still invaded. Hitler lacked the means to conquer the Soviet Union but he still invaded. This is what happens when political ideology is detached from reality, but trumps military planning.

    Secondly, I think the article misses how Putin views Western resolve and perhaps misunderstands the reality of Western resolve. The article implies in a matter of fact manner that if Putin attacks an Eastern European NATO country that all of NATO will respond and that Putin knows this. I dont think one can be confident in either assumption. The same nuclear war calculus will be at play whether its a war with Russia over Ukraine or over Estonia. Do you really think the American public, let alone the French or the Germans want a nuclear war with Russia over Estonia? Yes, the Treaty says an attack on one is an attack on all. And yes, the US and other NATO countries have said repeatedly that they will defend all NATO territory. But those are just words. And words are cheap. What happens when Putin invades the Baltic states and Biden has to decide whether to defend them and risk nuclear war? Remember this guy didnt want to continue a counterinsurgency war which cost roughly a handful of casualties a year, you think he's going to throw in when its nuclear war and the casualty estimates are in the billions? Maybe, but I wouldn't bet on it. Putin understands this political weakness and senses a lack of resolve. And if his invasion of Ukraine goes well, you better believe the Baltic states are next on his target list. Putin wants to break NATO and picking off a periphery member state and watching the alliance blink will do just that. So, to avoid this doomsday clock, the West should do EVERYTHING short of war to turn the Russian invasion of Ukraine into a bloody mess for Russia. The West needs to bleed the Russian bear white on the spearpoint of Ukraine, because if this invasion is completed and the conquest is consolidated, a NATO country is likely next on Putin's list. And then the choice will be nuclear war or the collapse of the NATO alliance. We don't want to get to that decision point. And wishful thinking based on assumptions where blue always wins is not going to prevent the worse case scenario.

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    1. Thom

      Picking up on this, I would appreciate someone explaining to me why a no fly zone (NFZ) is a binary choice -- either there is one in all of Ukraine or there is none at all. I understand why it is likely too late to enforce a NFZ over Kyiv or other areas where Russia has already asserted itself. I do not understand why a proactive, defensive NFZ in western Ukraine that does not border on Russia must be eliminated as an option. Obviously this would be a risk, but isn't it an acceptable risk given the human and other costs of not doing it?

      By taking the option of a NFZ of any kind, in any part of Ukraine, off the table, is NATO not implicitly accepting the Russian premise that Ukraine is in Russia's sphere of influence and there it must stay? Why does it count for so little that the sovereign, legitimate Ukrainian government is asking NATO for a NFZ within its own borders to prevent the slaughter of its people? Again, can't we provide some protection to some areas that are not yet under attack?

      The logic underlying the elimination of any NFZ as an option could, it seems to me, easily extend to preclude military and humanitarian aid from Poland or another NATO country, if Russia deliberately misinterprets that as an act of war against it. I think R. James is right that the question after that is what happens to NATO when it is finally faced with the need to respond to an attack on Poland or some other eastern European member.

      These are genuine questions. I'm no expert on any of this. It just seems to me that if you eliminate all of the bad options, there are none left.

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      1. R. James

        I would oppose any NFZ in Ukraine because it is highly likely that it will result in NATO taking hostile action against Russia or vice versa simply by enforcing or evading such a No Fly Zone. Think about the scenario where a Russian jet flies through a No Fly Zone in defiance of it and does not comply with warning orders, NATO would then have to shoot it down or admit the no fly zone is de facto unenforceable. There is also a risk from Russian anti-air forces, fire do to mistaken identity and fog of war. This will then likely result in a horizontal escalation of the conflict. But I do think any action short of war such as sanctions against all Russian and Belorussian imports, the denying of Russian civilian aircraft and shipping into Western countries, encouraging Western devestment of Russia, sanctions against political leadership, the training and supplying of Ukrainian military, and allowing Western civilians to voluntarily travel to Ukraine to fight for them should be done.

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    George.Skinner

    The strategy for dealing with Ukraine is containment of Putin, and perhaps supporting the conditions necessary for his internal downfall. The inept performance of the Russian military has been eye-opening, and suggests an opportunity to seriously downgrade what capability they have and undermine Russia's confidence. Keep supporting Ukraine with munitions and supplies, and Russia's force gets bled away. Keep applying sanctions to Russia's economy, and they're deprived of the ability to rebuild their capability in the short- or medium-term.
    In parallel, this undermines Putin at home. His regime's propaganda will become increasingly dissonant with reality, and people will notice. The oligarchs will feel the pain.
    What NATO needs to do to support the containment is make it extremely obvious where *their* red lines are. If the Russian military has been broken facing Ukrainian resistance, help them recognize the massive increase in capability they'd feel if they attacked a NATO country. Remind Russia that a nuclear exchange is not winnable. This may not deter Putin, who's miscalculated badly on several recent occasions, but it's important that others in his regime believe it.

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    1. Anna A

      Agreed on all points.

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